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The Changing Determinants of High School Attainment
in Rural China

Abstract:
The substantial shift in rural schooling levels and the contemporaneous changes in
educational finance policy including tax and fees reform, two exempt and one compensation
policy and school rearrangement policy, raise the need for a fresh look at the determinants of
rural education. In this paper we have examined the determinants of rural high school
attainment and changes in those determinants between the years 2002 and 2007 at multiple
levels (individual, family and community level). We find that the increasing importance of
community versus household and individual factors in determining rural children’s schooling
attainment between 2002 and 2007. In addition, government expenditures have a significant
and positive impact on high school attainment in both years, with a shift in the relative
importance of budgetary versus extrabudgetary funding.

Key words: rural education, high school attainment, family background, public finance,
human capital, China
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1.

Introduction

Studies of education in China have long noted the large and persistent gap in educational
attainment between China’s urban and rural populations (Knight and Li 1993, Knight, Sicular
and Yue 2013).

Although rural education levels continue to lag behind those in urban areas,

the past fifteen years have seen a remarkable change in rural schooling attainment:
attending high school is increasingly common (Connelly & Zheng, 2010). This change is
evident in official statistics on school progression rates as well. Nationwide (including both
urban and rural areas) between 2000 and 2009 the progression rate from junior high to high
school (including both vocational and academic high schools) increased from 50 percent to
over 80 percent (Figure 1).

Separate statistics on rural progression rates are not available,

but in view of the facts that over 60 percent of children aged 15-17 are rural and that urban
progression rates were already relatively high in 2000, we deduce that this increase reflects
significant change in rural areas. 1

This pattern is also evident in rural household survey

data, including the survey data analyzed here (discussed in more detail later), which show an
increase in high school attainment among children aged 16 through 20 years from less than 30
percent in 2002 to nearly 40 percent in 2007.
<Figure 1>
The expansion of high school attainment in rural China is related to several recent
policy initiatives in the area of rural education, including the rolling out of free, compulsory
nine-year education, the reform of rural educational finance, and substantial increases in
government expenditures on rural education. In 2000 the Chinese government implemented
the tax and fee reform in rural areas, which helped to reduce the financial burden of education
on rural families. Around the same time, the government initiated the “two exempts and one
compensation” program, which exempted poor rural students from the costs of textbooks and
other miscellaneous educational fees and provided them compensation for living expenses in
school dormitories. Expansion of free compulsory education occurred after 2000, especially
in 2005 in poor areas and again in 2007 when free nine-year education was extended
1

Published statistics do not easily permit separation of progression rates between urban and rural students, in part
because most rural high school children attend high schools located in towns and cities, not in villages.
Consequently, statistics for rural high school enrolments undercount the number of rural children in high school,
and statistics for urban high school enrolments include rural students. These issues are discussed in Rozelle et al.
(2009), which also reports the share of children aged 15-17 who are rural.
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nationwide.

Concurrently with the implementation of these policies, government education

spending per student increased substantially, and most rapidly for rural junior high school
(figure 2).
<Figure 2>
Increased schooling levels in rural China, however, may also be the result of changes in
household resources and choices.

After 2000 rural households enjoyed a period of rapid

income growth. Also, family sizes declined, and levels of parental schooling was increasing.
Past studies have found that such household characteristics are associated higher levels child
schooling. It is also possible that the wage premium on a high-school education has increased;
if so, this would lead rural families to increase investments in high school education for their
children.
Much of the discourse about schooling in rural China has been in the context of the
educational landscape that prevailed before these more recent developments. Most available
studies about rural educational attainment in China use data from before 2005. Some analyses
use more recent data, but focus on education in poor or minority areas, or of other subgroups
for which educational attainment has not kept pace with broader trends. 2
The substantial shift in rural schooling levels and the contemporaneous changes in the
macro and micro variables that underlie schooling outcomes raise the need for a fresh look at
the determinants of rural education. This is the aim of our analysis, which examines changes
in the determinants of high school attainment in rural China. Economists typically view
schooling in developing countries as a household investment decision, and empirical analyses
estimate the impact of family characteristics such as income, parental schooling, and the
number of siblings on children’s schooling outcomes (Becker & Lewis 1973, Ashenfelter &
Rouse 1998, Björklund et al. 2010, Lazear 1980). Some studies also consider community or
school district factors related to local economic development and school supply that may
influence educational outcomes (Strauss, 1995).

In our analysis we examine the role of

individual and household-level variables, local community variables, and, given the marked
expansion in government funding of rural schools, local government educational

2

For an extensive review and thorough list of published articles on the determinants of educational differentials in
China, see Zhang et al. (2012).
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expenditures.
Changes in the determinants of school outcomes have been noted in other countries.
For example, the cohort-specific effects of years of parents’ education on years of child’s
education have been found to be higher for older cohorts and lower for younger cohorts (e.g.
Hertz et al., 2007).

Some studies report that in developed countries the impact of family

income is less significant after the expansion of education (Shavit ＆Blossfeld 1993, Erikson
＆ Jonsson 1996b). These findings raise the question of whether with economic growth and
the expansion of education in rural China, the impact of parental schooling and income has
similarly declined.
The literature on the determinants of Chinese children’s schooling is now fairly
extensive, and studies have found that the impact of family background and household
characteristics has changed over time. Knight et al. (2011) investigate intergenerational
mobility by cohort group using data for 2007. They report that the correlation between
parental schooling and children’s schooling has risen over time, but in recent years this trend
has been reversed in rural areas. They attribute the reversal to the recent rural policy of free
compulsory nine-year education.

Li (2010) shows that the expansion of higher education

has augmented the impact of family background on children’s educational attainment, and
that educational inequality between rural and urban areas is enlarging. Liu (2008) analyzes the
influence of family background on children’s educational attendance of primary school and
middle school using national census data from 1980, 1990 and 2000. He reports that that the
significance and magnitude of the influence of parental education has increased over time, but
the impact of the father’s career has remained unchanged.
Our analysis makes several contributions. First, it provides new, relatively recent
evidence on the determinants of rural high school attainment during this recent period of
change.

Our analysis makes use of rural household survey data from the China Household

Income Project (CHIP) for the years 2002 and 2007.

These two years are well suited for this

study as 2002 was before (or mostly before) the rural education policy changes, and 2007 is
after most of the key policy changes had been implemented nationally.
Second, our analysis combines household data with village-level data and also with
administrative data on local government education expenditures.
5

By so doing, we are able

to investigate the relationship of schooling outcomes with household characteristics and also
community-level characteristics.

In this regard our analysis contributes to a growing body

of work on the role factors outside the household that may influence household schooling
decisions in rural China (e.g., Yang 2007), as well as to the more general literature on the
impact on schooling outcomes of school resources and public educational spending (Card and
Krueger 1992a, Hanushek 1997 and 2006, Cascio et al. 2011).

Our hypothesis is that

community characteristics and public expenditures are significant determinants of high school
attainment; in addition, we propose that between 2002 and 2007 the importance of household
variables has declined, while that of community and government expenditure variables has
been stable or even increased.
Third, in our empirical analysis we employ a multilevel model. The empirical literature
on high school attainment in general and in China often uses a standard probit or logit model
(Jensen 1997, Al-Samarrais 1998, Sawada 2001, Yang 2007).

As discussed, however, the

factors that affect household educational choices are multilevel. Schooling decisions within
the same community may be not be independent, and variances may differ among
communities.

Multilevel estimation methods can explicitly handle these factors and is well

suited to hierarchically structured data such as that for students clustered within communities.
Multilevel models, also known as hierarchical linear and mixed effects models, have been
used elsewhere in the literature to examine how students’ test scores are influenced by both
individuals and school-level factors.
In the next section we outline our empirical approach.
and provides some relevant policy background.

Section three describes the data

Section four reports the estimation results.

As discussed in the concluding section, we find that some community variables and
government expenditures are significantly related to high school attainment, and that in the
wake of China’s rural education reforms, the significance of family income as a determinant
of high school attainment has declined.
2.

Empirical Approach
We are interested in estimating the effects of individual-level and community-level

factors on an individual-level binary outcome variable.

In this context, observations within

the same community are likely to be correlated, and the assumptions of the standard
6

regression model may be violated.
model with random intercepts.

We therefore use a multilevel or hierarchical regression

This model estimates slope coefficients that are uniform for

the entire sample, but allows the intercept to vary across communities.

A standard,

single-level model is nested within the multilevel model, so that one can test which
specification is appropriate.
model.

Since our outcome variable is binary, we use a logit multilevel

In-depth discussion of such models can be found in Goldstein (2003), Snijders and

Bosker (1999), Steele (2009) and Leckie (2010).
Let Hij be a binary variable that equals one if individual i in community j attends or has
attended high school.

The probability of high school attainment pij can be then written as

Prob ( H ij = 1) = pij

.

(1)

Using (1), we can then write the first-level logit regression equation as

pij
log(
) = β 0 j + β1 x1ij + ... + β K x Kij ,
1 − pij

(2)

where β 0 j is the intercept for community j, and the β k are slope parameters on K
individual-level characteristics x kij .
In a multilevel model both the intercept and slope parameters can be functions of
community-level characteristics.

Due to the large number of individual and community

characteristics relevant to high school attainment in our application of the model, a full
multilevel model would yield an unwieldy number of interaction terms.

We therefore use a

random intercept model in which community-level characteristics enter only through the
intercept.

The second level regression equation is thus

β 0 j = γ 00 + γ 01q1 j + ... + γ 0 M qMj + u0 j ,

(3)

where γ 00 is the intercept, γ 0 m are slope parameters on M community-level characteristics

qmj , and u0 j is a random error term, normally distributed with mean zero.
Equation (3) can be substituted into (2) to obtain a mixed multilevel logit regression
equation that contains an intercept, individual-level characteristics, community-level
characteristics, and an error term:
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pij
log(
) = γ 00 + β1 x1ij + ... + β K x Kij + γ 01q1 j + ... + γ 0 M q Mj + u 0 j .
1 − pij

(4)

This is the regression equation that we estimate.
According to Raudenbush & Bryk (2002), estimation of a fully unconditional model
without any predictors can provide information on how much variation lies at the community
level and how much is due to individuals’ characteristics. As an initial step in multilevel
analysis, then, it is useful to run an intercept only or “null” model

pij
log(
) = γ 00 + u 0 j
1 − pij

.

(5)

Estimation of equation (5) yields an estimate of the average log odds of high school
attainment γˆ00 .

The intercept for each community j is γˆ00 + uˆ0 j , and the estimated variance

among communities is σˆ u20 . A test of the hypothesis σˆ u20 = 0 indicates whether variance
among communities is significant.
3.

Data, Descriptive Statistics and Policy Background
In our analysis we use data from two sources.

Data on individual, household and

village characteristics are from the Chinese Household Income Project (CHIP), and data on
public educational expenditures are from the Ministry of Education.

The CHIP has

conducted four rounds of household surveys of urban, rural and migrant households providing
data for the years 1988, 1995, 2002 and 2007.

In view of substantial differences in

educational policies and educational access between urban and rural areas, we use only the
rural data.

Since educational policies as well as the economic environment have changed

dramatically over time, and since we have matching data for county-level public education
expenditures only for later years, we confine our analysis to the two most recent rounds of the
survey (2002 and 2007).
The CHIP rural datasets contain household survey data with comprehensive information
about individual and household characteristics, including education and schooling attainment.
The CHIP also conducted village-level surveys so as to collect information about the
communities within which the sample households reside.

The village data include

information on schools and other community-level characteristics relevant to educational
8

outcomes.

We use data from the household survey for the first level, and data from the

village survey for the second level, of the multilevel analysis.

The CHIP 2002 rural survey

covers 22 provinces, 9200 households, and about 38000 individuals in 961 villages. The
CHIP 2007 rural survey covers 9 provinces, 8000 households, and more than 31000
individuals in 800 villages.
In our analysis we restrict the sample to children who reside with their parents and who
are 16 through 20 years old, inclusive. By restricting the sample to children who reside with
their parents, we have full, matched information about the children, their parents and their
natal households.

In China children generally begin school at ages 6 through 8 and complete

compulsory education (primary school and junior high school) in 8 to 9 years. The decision to
continue on into high school thus occurs by age 16. 3 We choose age 20 as upper limit on the
age range in order to include as many observations as possible in the sample while
minimizing selection bias that could arise due to older children moving out for work or to
marry and establish their own households.

In the CHIP datasets a trivial number (only 3 in

each year) of household heads and spouses of household heads are below the age of 21.

We

therefore conclude that it is rare for children to marry and establish a new household before
age 21.

With respect to migration, some children in this age range do engage in migrant

work, but usually of a short-term nature.

Consequently, they continue to be treated as

members of their natal households and are included in the survey.

In order to check for

selection bias that might arise if some older children have left the households, we carried out
the estimation using an alternative maximum age cutoff of 18 rather than 20.

The results

were stable, and so we conclude that using the older maximum age cutoff of 20 does not bias
the results.

The restricted sample contains 3973 individuals in 2002 and 2559 in 2007.

We match the CHIP data with county-level data from the Ministry of Education on
public expenditures on junior high school education for the years 1999 through 2007.

These

data allow us to analyze the impact on high school attainment of public education

3

Some may argue that attending high school requires passing certain qualification exams and that not all students
are qualified to attend high school. Some key high schools do indeed require a comparatively high examination
score, but other types of high schools do not have selection criteria. In our analysis high school includes all types
of secondary schools, including regular senior middle schools, adult senior middle schools, regular secondary
technical schools, vocational secondary schools, technical secondary schools, and adult technical secondary
schools.
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expenditures. 4

Specifically, we estimate the impact on the likelihood of high school

attainment of public budgetary (yusuannei) and extrabudgetary (yusuanwai) operating
expenditures (shiye zhichu) per student in junior high schools, the level of school immediately
preceding high school.

We expect that public expenditures at the junior high school level are

relevant to high school attainment because these expenditures are correlated with the quality
and cost of education during the three years of education that precede high school, and so
influence the willingness and ability of children to continue on to high school.
In rural China the level and structure of public educational funding changed during the
years under study here.

Between 2002 and 2007, China adopted nationwide a policy of free

public education through primary and junior high school.

This policy was accompanied by

increased public budgetary spending (see Figure 2), and the costs of education during the first
nine years borne by households were reduced.

This increase in government funding and

reduction in costs borne by households could have altered the relative importance of
household income versus public expenditures in determining children’s school attainment.
The increase in government funding of rural primary and junior high school education
was accompanied by policy measures aimed at reducing the role of extrabudgetary finance as
a source of education funding.

In China, extrabudgetary funding for schools has included

revenues from various sources such as a dedicated education fee (jiaoyu fujiafei) assessed on
rural enterprises and households (starting in 2002 the rural tax and fee reform prohibited the
assessment of such fees on rural households), tuition and fees, other revenues raised by
schools themselves, and funding for schools paid directly by institutions or enterprises
(Kipnis and Li 2010, Li, Park and Wang 2007). Although policy reforms have reduced the
relative importance of extrabudgetary funding for schools, they may remain important (Kipnis
and Li 2010, Li, Park and Wang 2007) and ideally should be included in the analysis.
Since we are analyzing high school attainment for individuals who are already of high
school age or older, in our analysis we use public expenditure data for the preceding years,
that is, in our analysis of high school attainment of individuals in the 2007 CHIP dataset, we

4

We acknowledge that the official data on educational expenditures in China do not capture all sources of public
and quasi-public funding. We expect, however, that the officially reported expenditures are correlated with
unreported and quasi-public funding. See Kipnis and Li (2010) for a discussion of the nature of such unreported
funds based on fieldwork in Shandong province.
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use average public expenditure data for the years 2004-2006, and in our analysis of
individuals in the 2002 CHIP dataset, we use average public expenditure data for the years
1999-2001.
The Ministry of Education data after 2001 are more complete than those for 1999-2001.
Starting in 2002 the dataset contains both budgetary and extrabudgetary spending on
operating expenses per student, which together add up to total public expenditures on
operating expenses for junior high school per student.

For 1999-2001 the data contain

budgetary expenditures, but not extrabudgetary expenditures.

The 1999-2001 data, however,

contain information on total and budgetary operational expenditures per capita (renjun jiaoyu
jingfei zong zhichu and qizhong renjun caizheng yusuannei jiaoyu jingfei zhichu) for primary
school and junior high school together. With this information we calculate the ratio of
extrabudgetary to budgetary spending for both levels of school.

We use this ratio to

calculate county-level estimates of extrabudgetary expenditures per student for junior high
school.

This approach assumes that within each county the ratio of extrabudgetary to

budgetary spending for junior middle school is the same as that for primary school. 5
We note that county-level data are not available for all the counties in the CHIP surveys.
In 2002 the CHIP survey covers 122 counties, but county-level data for the three years
1999-2001 are missing for 21 of these counties.
counties.

The matched dataset therefore covers 101

In 2007 county-level data are missing for one of the 82 CHIP counties, so the

matched dataset covers 81 counties. The numbers of individuals aged 16-20 in the matched
datasets are 2796 and 2427 in 2002 and 2007, respectively.

The reasons for missing counties

are unclear, but we believe they are related to the renaming, reconfiguration, or
reclassification of counties.
Figure 3 compares budgetary educational expenditures per student in junior high school
in the sample counties with the national and regional averages.

Expenditure levels in the

sample counties are similar to, although slightly lower than, the national average.

This

pattern basically holds for the different regions (East, Center and West), although we note that
5

Since the dataset contains information on both budgetary and extrabudgetary expenditures for junior middle
school and for other levels of school for the years 2002-2006, we can check whether this assumption is reasonable.
Using the data for 2002, we have compared the ratio of budgetary to extrabudgetary spending for junior middle
school to the ratio for all levels of school. We found that the ratio is almost 1:1, and it holds for year 2003-2006
as well.
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the expenditure levels differ by region. Per student expenditures are highest in the East and
lowest in the West.

We conclude that the counties in our sample are not unusual with respect

to the levels of public investment in education.
< Figure 3>
<Tables 1 and 2>
Table 1 reports the definitions of and Table 2 gives descriptive statistics for variables
used in our analysis.

Descriptive statistics are reported both for the full restricted sample of

individuals aged 16 through 20 and for the reduced sample for which we have matched
county-level data.

The characteristics of the full and reduced samples are not significantly

different.
High school attainment is measured by the dummy variable chigh, which equals one if
the child is attending or has ever attended high school.

On average in our full sample, the

rate of high school attainment for individuals aged 16 through 20 increased from 28% in 2002
to 38% in 2007.

The total years of schooling of their parents (sum of the mother’s and

father’s education years) also increased, from 13.1 years in 2002 to 14.7 years in 2007.
both years males made up slightly more than half of the sample.

In

The number of siblings

declined, reflecting the impact of the one-child (or, in some rural areas, one-and-a-half child)
policy, and perhaps also due to changing preferences for family size.
These five years were a period of fairly rapid macroeconomic growth, as reflected in
increases in household income per capita as well as in public expenditures on education.
nominal terms, household income nearly doubled.

In

Government per student expenditures on

junior high school also nearly doubled (in nominal terms).

The composition of government

expenditures changed, with the share of extrabudgetary expenditures declining from 41% to
27%.

This change is consistent with fiscal reforms that occurred during this time frame.

Some other potentially important policy changes also took place between 2002 and 2007.
Starting in the late 1990s, but especially during first decade of the 2000s, China carried out a
“school consolidation” policy that involved pooling students into fewer, complete primary
schools so as to improve the quality of schooling (see Chen et al. 2011). This policy resulted
in a marked reduction in the number of rural primary schools. Between 2002 and 2007 the
number of rural primary schools nationwide declined by 29 percent (from 384,004 to
12

271,584) and the number of rural junior middle schools declined 12 percent (from 39735 to
32865) (NBS 2008 and 2003). 6
These changes are reflected in the CHIP village data.

The share of villages in our

sample without primary schools or teaching points increased from 34% to 57%. 7

These

changes in the supply of schooling within villages at the primary level may have affected
schooling choices.

We also include in our analysis a variable that captures the supply of, or

access to, junior high schools.

We note that the village-level information about junior high

schools is not consistent for the two years.

In 2002 we have information on the distance

(kilometers) to the nearest junior high school, and in 2007 we have information on the travel
time (hours) to the nearest junior high school.
4.

Estimation Results
Table 3 reports results from the null model.

variance of the error term σˆ u20 exceeds 0.5.

For both 2002 and 2007 the estimated

A test of the hypothesis σˆ u20 = 0 is rejected,

indicating that variance among communities is significant.

We conclude that

community-level characteristics play a role in explaining variation in high school attainment.
<Table 3>
Table 4 contains results from estimation of multilevel logit models that contain
individual and family characteristics, but no village-level variables.
however, enter through the random intercept.

Village-level effects,

Table 4 reports estimates for two models that

differ only in the way that household income enters the model.

In model 1, income enters

the regression as the continuous variable lnhincome (the log of household income per capita).
In model 2, income enters as a set of dummy variables, lowhincome (=1 if household income
per capita is in the bottom quarter of the sample income distribution) and highhincome (=1 if
household income per capita is in the top quarter of the sample income distribution), with the
omitted category being income per capita falling in the middle two quarters of the sample
income distribution.

Model 2 allows us to explore whether the coefficient on income is

different for low and high income groups.

Such could be the case if credit constraints

6
These statistics on numbers of schools count regular primary and regular secondary schools; they do not include
other types of schools such as primary teaching points and vocational secondary schools.
7
Teaching points are one-room schools that provided schooling for early grades, typically grades 1 through 4.
See Chen at al., 2011.
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differentially constrain education investments.

Because household incomes increased

substantially between 2002 and 2007, and because of the educational reforms that eliminated
tuition costs for junior high school education in rural areas, we expect that the estimated
coefficients on these income variables may have changed between the two years.
<Table 4>
Otherwise, models 1 and 2 are the same.

Both include as independent variables the age

and age squared of the child, the number of siblings, and dummy variables for whether the
child is male, has a single parent, lives with a grandparent, and has an ethnic minority father.
Both models also include province dummy variables to control for provincial-level fixed
effects.
Empirical studies find that in developing countries family income plays an important
role in children’s educational attainment (Jacoby, 1997, Sawada & Lokshin, 2001, Ota &
Moffatt, 2002). Studies for rural China generally report similar findings (e.g., Zhao &
Glewwe 2010).

Our estimates for 2002 are consistent with the literature (Table 4).

For

2002, in model 1 the coefficient on household income per capita is significant and positive,
implying that higher income is associated with a higher probability of high school attainment.
In model 2, compared to children in the middle two income quartiles, children in the poorest
quartile have a lower probability, and children in the richest quartile a higher probability, of
progressing to high school.

These findings are consistent with what one would expect if

poorer households face binding credit constraints that make it difficult for them to finance
their children’s high school education, and also if poorer households are more likely to
withdraw children from school earlier so that the children can enter the labor force and
contribute to household income.

Furthermore, low-income parents may not expect the same

economic returns to their children’s education as do higher-income parents (Lazear 1980).
Interestingly, in 2007 none of the household income variables is significant, that is,
household income is not significantly correlated with high school attainment.
several possible explanations for this result.

We suggest

One explanation is that due the substantial

increases in household incomes between 2002 and 2007 relaxed credit constraints faced by
lower income families.

Another explanation is that increased government expenditures on

rural education may have reduced the importance of family resources.
14

We explore this

mechanism further in the next section of the paper by introducing government educational
expenditures into the regression model.
Most of the other explanatory variables in models 1 and 2 have the expected signs.

The

impact of parental schooling on children’s educational achievement has received attention in
the economics literature.

Studies have found that one or both parents’ education has a

significant impact on children’s schooling (e.g.,Behrman & Knowles 1999, Handa 1996,
Oreopoulos 2006, and Tansel 1997).

In the research on China, Hannum (2005), Connelly &

Zheng (2003) and Liu (2007) report that parental education is significant, but Brown & Park
(2002) and Li & Tsang (2003) report that neither parents’ education is significant.

We find

that the coefficient on parental schooling (the sum years of schooling of the mother and
father) is significant and positive in both 2002 and 2007. 8 The magnitude of the coefficient is
a bit smaller, however, in 2007.

We note that since we do not include any measures of

children’s ability in our regression, the coefficient on parents’ education may be capturing the
unobserved ability of the parents, which is likely correlated with the ability of their children.
Studies have found that boys are more likely to attend high school (Admas & Hannum,
2005, Connelly & Zheng, 2003, Hannum, 2003). Our findings show that the coefficient on
the male dummy variable is significant and positive in 2002, but it becomes smaller and less
significant in 2007, suggesting some erosion of the privileged position of boys.

This would

be consistent with a story in which as incomes increase, the costs of schooling decline, and
family sizes shrink, households are less financially constrained and so do not have to choose
boys over girls.

Our results regarding number of siblings are also consistent with this story.

We find that children with more siblings are less likely to attend high school, but the
magnitude and significance of the relationship are smaller in 2007 than in 2002. Other studies
on China have also found a negative relationship between number of siblings and school
attainment (Connelly & Zheng 2003, Hannum 2003).
Children’s health status has a significant, negative impact on high school attainment in
8
Parental schooling for children in a single family are calculated by the schooling of household head plus
household spouse. If either mother or father’s schooling is missing, the missing value is replaced by the average
schooling of spouse for matched marriage. For example, if father’s schooling of children who live with a single
mother is missing and the highest qualification of this single mother is upper secondary school, then this child’s
father’s schooling is replaced by 13, since the average schooling of husband for women with an upper secondary
school qualification is 13 years. This processing method may be not reasonable, but the missing values is less than
5% and will not largely affect our results.
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2002, but not in 2007.

The reasons for this change again may be related to the increased

income levels, which provide families with more resources to invest in health and pay for
health care.

It may also reflect the implementation of the new rural cooperative medical care

scheme, which was initiated in 2003; by 2007 the national participation rate of rural residents
in this scheme had reached 86 percent (NBS 2011, Table 21-21).

The new rural cooperative

medical scheme is a voluntary program that provides coverage of inpatient medical care and
insurance against catastrophic costs for a modest enrolment fee (Li, Sato and Sicular 2013).
In 2002 the rural cooperative medical scheme was not yet available, and most rural
households had no access to health insurance.
The estimated coefficients on the dummy variable for minority status are not significant
in either year.

Research about the effect of minority status on schooling in rural areas is

limited, but a study by Connelly & Zheng (2003) found that minority pupils have limited
educational opportunity. Having a single parent also does not have a significant coefficient
in either year.

This result is at odds with evidence for the U.S. that finds children living with

both parents are more likely to attend high school (Oreopolous et al. 2006).

A possible

reason for a different finding in rural China is that with the expansion of migrant work, it is
now common for a parent to be absent even in households that have not experienced the
divorce or death of a parent.

Also, the presence of other adult relatives such as grandparents

could compensate for the absence of a parent.

Indeed, our estimates for 2002 indicate that

children who lived with a grandparent were significantly more likely to attend high school.
The role of grandparents, however, is no longer significant in 2007.
Table 5 reports results from estimation of multilevel logit regression models that contain
community characteristics as well as individual and family characteristics.
estimated three alternative specifications.
not government expenditure variables.

We have

Model 3 includes village-level characteristics but
Model 4 includes village-level characteristics and

total county government expenditures per student on junior high school.

Model 5 is the

same as model 4 except that budgetary and extrabudgetary expenditures enter separately, so
that we can identify whether these two sources of funds have had different effects on our
outcome variable. Government expenditure variables enter the model in log form.

In all the

models in Table 5, household income is measured using the continuous variable lnhincome.
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These three models also include all the other individual and household variables in models 1
and 2, as well as provincial dummy variables.
The village-level variables we use in these models are related to community educational
resources and to the overall socio-economic environment in the village.

The variable

vnoprimary is a dummy variable that equals one if the village does not have a primary school,
vmiddistan is a measure of the distance from the village to the nearest junior middle school
(2007 in kilometers; 2002 in travel time), and lnvincome is the log of average household
income per capita in the village.

We also estimated alternative specifications that included a

variety of other village-level variables, and we examined whether village characteristics were
correlated with individual and household characteristics by including the village means of
household net income per capita and parental schooling as centering variables, but these
variables were not statistically significant, so we do not report the results here. 9
The potential impact of these village-level variables on children’s high school attainment
is not entirely straightforward.

We would expect that the presence of a primary school in the

village and shorter distance to a junior high school would, all else equal, reduce the costs of
education and so increase the probability of continuing on in school.

It is possible, however,

that a trade-off exists between numbers of rural schools and their quality, and that the
consolidation of village schools between 2002 and 2007 was accompanied by an improved
quality of education in the remaining, more distant schools.

Research has found that school

quality is important to students’ educational achievement and to schooling decisions (Card &
Krueger, 1992, Tan et. al. 1997). Low-quality schools may induce pupils to lose interest in
their studies and push students out of schools.
Unfortunately we do not have any measures of school quality in our dataset, so we
cannot measure the impact of school quality directly.

Average village income, however, may

be correlated with and so capture some of the effects of school quality.

Also, models 4 and 5

include government expenditure variables, which may be correlated with school quality.
With respect to village average income, on one hand it is possible that the opportunity

9

Other village-level variables included the village population (or number of households), the percentage of
individuals in the village who are members of an ethnic minority, the percentage of the village labor force engaged
in migrant employment, the percentage of the village labor force not working in agriculture, the local wage for
unskilled labor, and distance to the nearest town or city.
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cost (foregone income earned by the child) of keeping children in school is greater in villages
with a high average income per capita. Consequently, students in such villages may leave
school at an earlier stage.

On the other hand, villages with higher incomes and better

socio-economic conditions may have more community resources to support schooling, and
also their richer cultural environment and positive peer effects may raise schooling levels for
all families.

Household budget constraints may be less constraining in richer villages,

because such villages sometimes provide subsidies to children of low-income families and
school quality may be higher, which can increase the expected returns to education (Knight et
al. 2009).
Comparing model 3 to model 1, we find that including village-level variables improves
the fit of the regression model slightly, as the AIC and BIC statistics of model 3 are smaller.
Nevertheless, few of the village-level variables are significant.
characteristic is average village income in 2007.

The only significant village

The log of average village income has a

positive coefficient in both years, but is significant only in 2007.

This finding suggests that

the influence of the community’s economic environment on educational attainment became
more important between 2002 and 2007.
We note that the results for model 3 indicate that the presence or absence of a primary
school within the village is not a significant determinant of high school attainment.

Model

3, however, does not control for differences school quality between village schools and
schools in townships where students from surrounding villages are pooled.

The findings of

models 4 and 5, which include government expenditure variables, provide additional insights
on this point.
<Table 5>
Models 4 and 5 add government expenditure variables to the set of community-level
characteristics (see Table 5).

Model 4 includes total expenditures on junior high schools per

student (the sum of budgetary and extrabudgetary expenditures), and in model 5, budgetary
and extrabudgetary expenditures enter the model separately.

To investigate whether

government funding of schools has larger effects for poorer households, and for girls than
boys, we also estimated alternative model specifications that included interactions between
government expenditures and household income and interactions between government
18

expenditures and the gender of the child.

None of the interaction terms was significant,

however, so we do not report the results here.
Adding government expenditure variables further improves the fit of the regression
models, especially in 2002, and the results support the conclusion that government
expenditures are positively and significantly related to high school attainment.

The

estimates for model 4 give significant, positive coefficients on total government expenditures
for both 2002 and 2007.

The magnitude of the coefficient is similar in 2002 and 2007,

indicating that the substantial increases in government expenditures on rural schools between
the two years did not diminish the size of the relationship between government expenditures
and the outcome variable.
The estimates for model 5 reveal differences in the impact of budgetary versus
extrabudgetary finance.

In both years budgetary expenditures have a positive, significant

coefficient, with the coefficient increasing slightly and becoming more significant in 2007.
In 2002 the coefficient of extrabudgetary expenditures is positive and significant, although
smaller in magnitude than budgetary expenditures.

In 2007 it is no longer significant.

These results suggest that China’s school finance reforms may have had the intended effect of
increasing the role of budgetary funds and reducing the role of extrabudgetary funds in rural
education.
Comparing the results for models 4 and 5 with model 3, we find that including
government expenditure variables does not much alter the estimated coefficients of other
independent variables.

One coefficient that does change, however, is that for vnoprimary,

which is not significant in model 3 but becomes significant in 2002 when government
expenditures are included in the regression.

We would explain this as follows:

all else

equal, students who live in villages without schools are less likely to progress to high school.
All else equal, students at low quality schools are also less likely to progress to high school.
Village schools tend to be lower quality schools, so the positive effect of having a school in
the village will be offset by the quality of education unless the regression controls for the
quality of schooling.

Consequently, the coefficient on vnoprimary will be biased upward.

If government expenditures are correlated with school quality, then including controls for
government expenditures could reduce this bias.
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This would explain why the coefficient on

vnoprimary becomes significant in models 4 and 5.
We conclude this section with some observations about the coefficients on the household
and village income variables. In all the models household income per capita is significant in
2002 but not in 2007. These results point to a decline in the importance of household income
as a factor affecting whether or not children continue into high school, although other
household-level characteristics such as parents’ education continue to be significant.

In

contrast, village average income is not significant in 2002 but becomes significant in 2007.
Community-level resources, then, appear to have become more important.
expenditures are significant in both years.

Government

The fact that the coefficients on both household

and village income decline somewhat when government expenditures are added in the model
suggests that regressions that do not include government spending may overstate the role of
individual and village incomes.
5.

Conclusions
In this paper we have examined the determinants rural high school attainment and

changes in those determinants between the years 2002 and 2007.

Our analysis examines

determinants at multiple levels: at the individual and family levels, and at the community
level.

In our analysis we employ a multilevel binary response model, which addresses some

of the empirical issues associated with hierarchical, clustered data and heteroscedasticity.
Although our sample does not cover all provinces in China, all major regions are represented
and the findings can provide some valuable insights.
We find that household and individual characteristics continue to influence high school
attainment, but their importance declined between 2002 and 2007. The effects of parental
schooling and the child’s gender are positive and significant in both years, but their magnitude
decreases.

The effects of the number of siblings and household income are significant in

2002, but no longer so in 2007.

We believe that these results are consistent with changes

that occurred during this period: the relaxation of financial constraints on rural households
due to increases in household incomes, and reduced out-of-pocket costs of primary and junior
high school education. We note, however, that the relationship between income and schooling
outcomes does not appear to differ systematically between poorer and richer households.
We find the opposite direction of changes for village-level variables.
20

Average village

income and the presence or absence of a primary school within the village are not significant
in 2002, but they become significant in 2007. These results suggest the increasing importance
of community versus household and individual factors in determining rural children’s
schooling attainment.

The significant impact of the presence of a village primary school

raises questions about China’s rural school consolidation policy.

It suggests that if the

quality of village schools can be improved, then maintaining some schools in villages may
encourage more rural students to continue in school.
Government expenditures have a significant and positive impact on high school
attainment in both years, with a shift in the relative importance of budgetary versus
extrabudgetary funding. This finding confirms the importance of public education finance
as a factor contributing to increases in rural school attainment.

Although the average level

of public expenditures per student has risen, large disparities persist among regions and
localities (as reflected in Figure 3).

Despite increased central funding, local educational

finance continues to depend on the resources of local governments, and richer localities have
more resources than do poorer localities.

In the future, then, educational funding policies

should pay attention not only to the average level of funding, but to the distribution of
funding.

The same considerations apply to private and quasi-public funding for schools,

which are not captured in our analysis (Kipnis and Li 2010).
education funding warrant closer attention in future research.
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These hidden forms of
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Table 1.
Variable
Chigh

Definitions of the variables
Definition
High school attainment: if the child has ever attended or is currently
attending high school ＝1, otherwise ＝0

Male
Age
Age2
Badhealth
Sib
Hincome
Highhincome
Lowhincome
Pschool
Single
Grandparent
Fminority
Vnoprimary
Vmiddistan
Vincome
Total govedu

Budgetary
govedu
Extrabudgetary
govedu

Male=1, female =0
Child’s age
Child’s age, squared
If the child’s health status is somewhat poor or poor =1, otherwise =0
Number of siblings
Household annual net income per capita (unit: 10 thousand yuan; logged in
the regressions)
If household annual net income per capita is in the highest quartile of the
sample distribution =1, otherwise =0
If household annual net income per capita is in the bottom quartile of the
sample distribution =1, otherwise =0
Sum of father’s and mother’s years of schooling
If the child has a widowed or divorced parent =1, otherwise =0
If a grandparent lives in the household =1, otherwise =0
If father is an ethnic minority (not Han) =1, otherwise =0
If the village has no primary school or teaching point =1, otherwise =0
Distance to the nearest junior middle school (unit: kilometers in 2002;
hours of travel time in 2007)
Average household annual net income per capita in the village (unit: 10
thousand yuan; logged in regressions)
Average government operational expenditures on junior high school, per
student, during the prior three years (note: equals the sum of budgetary and
extrabudgetary expenditures) (unit: 1 thousand yuan)
Average government budgetary operational expenditures on junior high
school, per student, during the prior three years (unit: 1 thousand yuan;
logged in regressions)
Average government extrabudgetary operational expenditures on junior
high school, per student, during the prior three years (unit: 1 thousand yuan;
logged in regressions)
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Table 2.

Variable
chigh
male
age
age2
badhealth
sib
hincome
highhincome
lowhincome
pschool
single
grandparent
fminority
vnoprimary
vmiddistan
vincome
total govedu
budgetary
govedu
extrabudgetary
govedu
observations

Descriptive statistics
2002
2007
Std.
Std.
Mean
Err.
Mean
Err.
0.282
0.525
17.89
322.1
0.0327
1.486
0.263
0.250
0.250
13.14
0.0201
0.132
0.146
0.340
3.682
0.240

3973

0.450
0.499
1.430
51.39
0.178
0.993
0.215
0.433
0.433
4.472
0.140
0.338
0.353
0.474
4.870
0.137

3973

0.383
0.518
18.11
329.8
0.0686
1.166
0.516
0.250
0.250
14.70
0.00662
0.0245
0.00779
0.565
2.028
0.426

2559

0.486
0.500
1.373
49.64
0.253
0.931
0.409
0.433
0.433
3.552
0.0811
0.155
0.0879
0.496
0.817
0.245

2559

26

2002

2007

Mean

Std.
Err.

Mean

Std.
Err.

0.287
0.523
17.91
322.7
0.0311
1.415
0.263
0.263
0.252
13.14
0.0154
0.128
0.153
0.351
3.511
0.240
1.076

0.452
0.500
1.430
51.40
0.174
0.935
0.201
0.440
0.434
4.551
0.123
0.334
0.360
0.477
3.880
0.121
0.597

0.385
0.519
18.11
329.8
0.0669
1.137
0.514
0.243
0.254
14.73
0.00685
0.0254
0.00806
0.573
2.046
0.426
2.107

0.487
0.500
1.373
49.61
0.250
0.913
0.414
0.429
0.435
3.533
0.0825
0.157
0.0895
0.495
0.818
0.250
3.173

0.631

0.374

1.531

2.816

0.445
2796

0.292
2796

0.576
2514

0.556
2514

Table 3.

Null logit model of high school attainment, with only village fixed effects
2002

2007

Fixed effect
Intercept (γ00)
Random effect

Coeff.
-1.136
Coeff.

Std. Err.
0.072
Std. Err.

Coeff.
-0.756
Coeff.

Std. Err.
0.073
Std. Err.

Residual σ u20

0.644

0.125

0.548

0.120

observations
LR test vs. logistic regression χ 2
(Prob  χ 2 )

2664

2131

87.86 (2)
(0.000)

65.90 (2)
(0.000)
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Table 4. Multilevel logit model of high school attainment, without community-level
characteristics
Model 1
Model 2
2002
2007
2002
2007
male
0.199**
0.164*
0.204**
0.159
(2.403)
(1.688)
(2.474)
(1.641)
age
6.716***
2.890***
6.719***
2.975***
(7.680)
(2.775)
(7.628)
(2.839)
age2
-0.185***
-0.089***
-0.186***
-0.091***
(-7.623)
(-3.064)
(-7.570)
(-3.128)
badhealth
-0.514**
0.296
-0.508**
0.300
(-1.999)
(1.506)
(-1.972)
(1.525)
sib
-0.179***
-0.123*
-0.186***
-0.113*
(-3.338)
(-1.872)
(-3.473)
(-1.671)
log hincome
0.360***
0.115
(4.577)
(1.207)
lowhincome
-0.303***
-0.057
(-2.632)
(-0.463)
highhincome
0.246**
0.008
(2.316)
(0.064)
pschool
0.102***
0.072***
0.105***
0.074***
(9.419)
(4.949)
(9.663)
(5.082)
single
0.095
-0.663
0.134
-0.679
(0.292)
(-0.923)
(0.410)
(-0.946)
grandparent
0.444***
0.321
0.439***
0.338
(3.698)
(1.044)
(3.649)
(1.101)
fminority
-0.191
0.582
-0.190
0.536
(-0.934)
(0.885)
(-0.929)
(0.816)
Constant
-61.868*** -25.030*** -62.481*** -25.760***
(-7.905)
(-2.678)
(-7.925)
(-2.740)
observations
3,973
2,559
3,973
2,559
groups
880
705
880
705
random effect intercept
0.471
0.698
0.475
0.691
(0.105)
(0.145)
(0.105)
(0.144)
AIC
4260.114
3199.925
4268.234
3208.356
BIC
4461.307
3324.025
4475.714
3325.366
39.50 (32)
55.29 (19)
40.51 (33)
54.25 (20)
LR test versus logistic
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
regression χ 2 (df)
(Prob  χ 2 )
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

28

Table 5. Multilevel logit model of high school attainment, with community-level
characteristics
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
2002
2007
2002
2007
2002
2007
Male
0.200**
0.169*
0.241**
0.176*
0.230**
0.175*
(2.413)
(1.750)
(2.502)
(1.763)
(2.394)
(1.747)
age
6.716***
2.891***
6.026***
2.846***
5.911***
2.850***
(7.672)
(2.760)
(5.924)
(2.660)
(5.822)
(2.626)
age2
-0.185***
-0.089***
-0.166*** -0.088*** -0.163*** -0.088***
(-7.616)
(-3.050)
(-5.873)
(-2.949)
(-5.772)
(-2.910)
badhealth
-0.511**
0.279
-0.448
0.254
-0.450
0.253
(-1.989)
(1.420)
(-1.475)
(1.243)
(-1.485)
(1.236)
sib
-0.178***
-0.083
-0.199***
-0.056
-0.209***
-0.058
(-3.314)
(-1.253)
(-3.109)
(-0.794)
(-3.286)
(-0.814)
log hincome
0.345***
0.036
0.278***
0.023
0.281***
0.024
(4.192)
(0.370)
(2.863)
(0.226)
(2.892)
(0.243)
pschool
0.101***
0.069***
0.097***
0.063***
0.098***
0.063***
(9.327)
(4.744)
(7.900)
(4.200)
(7.976)
(4.204)
single
0.092
-0.623
0.147
-0.590
0.151
-0.595
(0.282)
(-0.874)
(0.350)
(-0.822)
(0.360)
(-0.827)
grandparent
0.447***
0.288
0.325**
0.416
0.327**
0.415
(3.715)
(0.936)
(2.270)
(1.296)
(2.285)
(1.293)
fminority
-0.172
0.749
-0.190
0.495
-0.259
0.505
(-0.840)
(1.141)
(-0.832)
(0.747)
(-1.113)
(0.760)
vnoprimary
-0.121
0.076
-0.008
-0.247**
-0.003
-0.208*
(-1.115)
(0.608)
(-0.059)
(-2.042)
(-0.022)
(-1.729)
vmiddistan
-0.005
-0.074
-0.020
-0.111
-0.025
-0.114
(-0.484)
(-0.980)
(-1.270)
(-1.426)
(-1.528)
(-1.460)
log vincome
0.082
0.404***
-0.110
0.287**
-0.084
0.290**
(0.628)
(3.475)
(-0.676)
(2.377)
(-0.516)
(2.397)
log totalgovedu
0.617***
0.560***
(3.429)
(3.754)
log budgetary
0.362*
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regression: χ 2 (df)

(0.104)
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36.35 (35)
(0.000)

(0.141)
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3318.581
50.36 (22)
(0.000)

(0.104)
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3273.472
11.00 (36)
(0.000)

(0.147)
3007.491
3140.762
48.40 (23)
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(Prob  χ 2 )
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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(0.104)
3069.922
3283.616
10.41 (37)
(0.000)

(0.148)
3010.306
3149.372
48.82 (24)
(0.000)

Figure 1. National junior high and high school progression rates, 1990-2008
Notes: Progression rates are calculated as the number of entrants to the given level of
schooling divided by the number of graduates from the prior level of schooling. These data
are from the same year; that is, entrants to school in August/September are divided by
graduates who finished school several months earlier, that is, in June/July of the same year.
The high school progression rate includes entrants to technical secondary schools.
Sources: NBS (1996, 2001, 2009); Ministry of Education, Department of Planning (1991);
Ministry of Education, Department of Development and Planning (2008).
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Figure 2 National average total educational expenditures per student, 1988-2008
Source: Ministry of Education data.

Figure 3 Budgetary educational expenditure on rural junior high school, per student
Source:

Ministry of Education data.
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